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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MONTY MIGLEY and JONNIE
H.LGLEY,

)

Plaintiffs/Respondents,

;

vs.

]

RALPH L. WALKER,

]

Defendant, Appellant.

Case No. 87045

]

PETITION FOR REHEARING
BACKGROUND
This is an appeal from the First Judicial District
Court's denial of the Motion of Defendant/Appellant RaJph
Walker (Walker) to vacate a judgment.

Judgment was

granted on November 20, 1986, and entered on November 28,
1986.

On September 23, 1987, Walker moved to vacate the

Judgment.

He did so by filing a "Motion to Vacate

Judgment" which was accompanied by a "Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Vacate
Judgment.

These pleadings are attached as Exhibits 1 and

2 hereto.

The Plaintiffs/Respondents, Monty and Jonnie

Higley (Higleys) filed a Memorandum in response to

Defendant's Motion, Exhibit 3 hereto.

Thereafter Walker

filed a response to Plaintiff's Memorandum, Exhibit 4.
The Court denied Walker's Motion in its Memorandum
Decision dated the 23rd of October, 1987, Exhibit 5.
Walker appealed.
In an Order, signed by the Clerk of this Court, dated
March 3, 1988, Exhibit 6 this Court summarily reversed the
lower court on the grounds that the action was allegedly
stayed by the bankruptcy petition.

In so doing, the Court

failed to take into consideration that there is no factual
documentation in the record on appeal which supports any
of Walker's allegations.

It should be noted that, in a

collateral proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Colorado, the Honorable Roland J. Brumbaugh
found that the Higleys did not receive timely notice of
Walker's filing of the bankruptcy, a transcript of the
Court's findings in that action is attached as Exhibit 7.
THE FOLLOWING ARE POINTS OF LAW AND FACT THE
COURT OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPREHENDED.
I.
THE RECORD ON APPEAL IS DEVOID OF THE FACTS
WALKER MUST SHOW TO SUPPORT HIS MOTION.

-2-

The contents of the record on appeal pertaining to
Walker's Motion to Vacate the Judgment
two Memoranda.

are a Motion and

In his Memorandum in support of his Motion

Mr. Walker categorizes his first section as a "Statement
of Facts".
manner.

Facts may not come before the Court in this

Despite Walker's characterization of these items

as facts, they are merely statements of counsel, or
statements of the party.

In order for these statements to

rise to the level of the facts they would have to be in
the form of an Affidavit (sworn testimony), a deposition
(testimony^given under oath), or some exception thereto,
which could have been accomplished by providing a
certified copy of court records pursuant to Rule 902 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Such evidence is required to raise the issues Walker
attempted to raise in his Motion.

In Chapman v. Chapman,

728 P.2d 121, 122 (Utah 1986) this Court said, "Typically,
factual disputes are raised by sworn statements."
"Because these 'answers' are outside the record, we cannot
consider them."

The Chapman Court cited the cases of In

re: Cluff, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978) and Watkins v.
Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 P.2d 154 (1963) which also
require facts.

-3-

Such factual information was required to be submitted
with the Motion in order to properly address the Rule .60
argument.

See In re: Snyder, 701 P.2d 153 (Colo. Ct. App.

1985). This factual information is required of Walker
since he has the burden of proof in this matter pertaining
to an automatic stay claim.

See In re: Lanham

Manufacturing Co. Inc., 31 BR 195, 199 (S.D. Bankr. 1983)
The court apparently relied upon assertions in the
pleadings to support allegations that:
1.

Walker filed bankruptcy;

2.

The date of the filing;

3.

Higleys' received notice of the bankruptcy; and

4.

Higleys' actions violated the stay.

As shown hereafter the mere filing of bankruptcy by
Walker is not conclusive as to whether or not Higleys1
actions violated the stay and/or the Judgment was void.
II.
THE JUDGMENT MAY BE VOIDABLE BUT IT IS NOT VOID.
Walker asserts that Higleys' Judgment is void per se.
This is not the law.

The Court In re Fuel Oil Supply and

Terminaljng, Inc., 30 BR 360, 361 (N.D.Tex. Bankr. 1903)
clarified the status of post stay judicial activity:

-4-

Moreover, the characterization of every
violation of § 362 as being absolutely void
is inaccurate and overly broad. For
example, certain good faith actions under §§
542(c) and 549(c) of the Bankruptcy Code are
protected although they may be technical
violations of the stay. This is also true
for certain acts permitted under § 546 of
the Code. More accurately, stay violations
may be voidable at the debtor's or trustee's
instance rather than absolutely void.
(emphasis added).
Walker has initiated an action to address these sorts
of issues in the bankruptcy court.

This court should

defer to that court's expertise, especially where Walker
failed to properly prepare the lower court's record for
appeal by failing to include necessary factual
information.
In re Manitta, 1 BR 393, 395 (C.D.Cal. Bankr. 1979)
is a case with striking similarity to this case.
is well summarized in its ruling:
Defendant suggested that the making of
findings and the entry of judgment on March
14, 1979 were in violation of the automatic
stay. But neither the plaintiffs nor their
attorneys were scheduled by the bankrupts as
creditors, and the defendant gave no notice
of the bankruptcy filing to the state court
or to plaintiffs or to plaintiffs'
attorneys. It is common practice for the
Clerk of this Court, at the request of a
bankrupt, to issue a formal, notice of stay
which can be served on creditors
immediately. That was not done in this
case.

-5-

The case

Under the circumstances, the signing of the
findings and judgment after bankruptcy,
memorializing a decision rendered before
bankruptcy was no more than voidable,
certainly not void, (emphasis added)
The Higleys1 actions were addressed before Judge
Roland Brumbaugh of the Colorado Bankruptcy Court on the
Higleys1 Motion for Change of Venue of Walkers bankruptcy
adversary proceedings on the automatic stay violation
allegations.

After a full hearing Judge Brumbaugh

returned the action^to Utah and noted that it appeared
that Higleys did not in fact have notice.
line

See page 3,

21 of Exhibit 6 hereto.
Since Higleys1 Judgment is at best voidable, and not

void, summary disposition is inappropriate.
III.
IF ACTION ON THE JUDGMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE IT IS
ONLY INAPPROPRIATE AS TO WALKER, NOT THE REAL
ESTATE RECOVERY FUND.
The relevant automatic stay provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code are found at 11 U.S.C. § 362.

They stay

proceedings against the debtor or property of the
bankruptcy estate.

The application of the stay to

co-defendants was addressed in Neubauer v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglass Corp., 26 BR 644, 646 (E.D.Wis. Bankr. 1983).
The court said,

-6-

" . • . those cases that have carefully
considered whether § 362 operates to stay
proceedings against nonbankrupt codefendants
have unanimously held that it does not . . .
The legislative history demonstrates that
the purpose of the stay is to Mgive[] the
debtor a breathing spell from his
creditors," Extending the stay to
nonbankrupt codefendants furthers neither of
these purposes, and refusing to stay
proceedings against nonbankrupt codefendants
impairs neither of these purposes,
(citations omitted).
The only actions taken by Higleys, once they learned
of Walker's bankruptcy, was to seek recovery from the Real
PJstate Recovery Fund.

Recovery from the Fund, where

covered persons have bankrupted, is clearly contemplated
by the code.

See Utah Code Ann. 61-2a-5(4).

The Real Estate Recovery Fund was not named as a
defendant in the underlying action because the procedure
set forth in Utah Code Anno. 61-1-J et seq. dictates
otherwise.

This does not mean that the Fund was not a

quasi co-defendant.

Claimants in the Higleys position

have recovered from Real Estate Recovery Funds before.
In In re Phillips, 40 BR 194 (Colo. Bankr. 1984)
claimants with actions against a bankrupt Real Estate
Broker were allowed to proceed to collect against the
Colorado Real Estate Recovery Fund despite the debtor's

-7-

claims that their action was stayed.

See also In re Sam

Daily, 57 BR 83 (Hawaii Bankr. 1985).
Walker shows no facts to support a necessary
allegation to his claim, to wit: that Higleys are
proceeding against him or against property of the estate.
Even if the Judgment is ultimately deemed void as to
Walker it is not void as to the Real Estate Recovery Fund.
IV.
IITGLEYS' ACTIONS PRIOR TO FILING ARE NOT
STAYED OR VOID.
Walkers argument implies that the actions taken at
trial are void because he had allegedly told counsel and
the court that he would be filing bankruptcy.

It is no

surprise to anyone that a large number of people who are
sued respond by threatening to.file bankruptcy, few
ultimately do.
Relief granted by the automatic stay commences at the
time of filing, not at the time of threatening to file, 11
U.S.C. 362.
position.

Not surprisingly case law supports this

The court in In re Wheeler, 5 BR 600,603

(Ga.

Bankr. 1980) said, "It first must be noted that a petition
does not operate as a stay until it is filed."

-8-

This reasoning is of significance because the court
had granted Higleys judgment against Walker before Walker
filed bankruptcy.

It can be argued that Higleys had

obtained a judgment against Walker as required by
61-2a-5(l), that the proceedings had been terminated (by
bankruptcy) and that the Recovery Fund was liable to
Higleys without the benefit of the docketing of the
Judgment.
CONCLUSION
In order to qualify under Rule 60(b)(5) Walker must
present facts which show the judgment to be void.
not done so.

He has

If the Judgment is to be voided he must

follow proper procedure in the Bankruptcy Court.

He has

sought to short circuit that procedure by filing this
appeal collateral to his automatic stay litigation now
pending in that court.
His appeal will ultimately fail because the record on
appeal does not support his allegations that:
1.

The Judgment is void.

On the contrary the

record in his Bankruptcy proceeding (of which this court
may take judicial notice) shows lack of proper notice to
Higley's rendering the judgment at most voidable.

-9-

2.
estate.

Higleys have pursued him or the Bankruptcy
On the contrary the record shows only actions

against the Real Estate Recovery Fund.
Summary Reversal in this action is inappropriate and
this court's prior order should be vacated.
DATED this

/?

day of March, 1988.

MAILED, postage prepaid, four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing to Ralph L.
Walker, 8753 Wildrose Court, Iligland Ranch, Colorado 80126
this

//

day of March, 1988.

-10-

EXHIBIT
/

Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se
8753 Wildrose Court
HIGHLANDS RANCH, COLORADO 80126
(303) 791-8285
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MONTY
HIGLEY,
HIGLEY,
Plaintiffs,

AND

JONNIE
>
>
>
>
>

vs .
RALPH L. WALKER,
MARSHA M, WALKER, and
DAVID WALKER

MOTION TO VACATE JUDGEMENT

>
>

Defendants

>
>
>
>

Civil No. 24175

COMES now Ralph L. Walker , Defendant and moves the court to
vacate the
lacked

judgement entered

jurisdiction

over

the

on November 28, 1986
defendant.

as the court

This

accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities.
Dated this 10th day of September, 1987

Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se

motion

is

C E R T I F I C A T E

I

hereby

certify

that

OF

a

M A I L I N G

true

and

correct

copy of th

foregoing
MOTION TO VACATE JUDGEMENT

was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Robert H. Wilde, Attorney for Plaintiff
6925 Union Park Center, suite 490
Midvale, UT. 84047
Dated -this

day of September 1987.

Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se

Q<o

EXHIBIT

Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se
8753 Wildrose Court
HIGHLANDS RANCH, COLORADO 80126
(303) 791-8235

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MONTY

HIGLEY,

AND

JONNIE

HIGLEY,

>

Plaintiffs,

>
>
>
>

vs .

RALPH L. WALKER,
MARSHA M. WALKER, and
DAVID WALKER

Memorandum
of
Points
and
Authorities
in support
of
defendants
motion
to vacate
j udgement

>
>

Defendants

>
>
>
>

Civil No. 24175

Sl^lIMENT^OF^FACTS
1)

Ralph L. Walker, the defendant

the counsel

for the

petition would

in the

plaintiff and

be, filed

instant action

the court

on November

21, 1986

informed

that a bankruptcy
on behalf of the

defendant.

2)

The defendant filed a petition for a chapter

November 21,

1986,

Thereafter the

7 bankruptcy on

First District Court lacked

jurisdiction over the defendant Walker3)

The counsel for the

and has

continued to

plaintiff was

made aware

of the filing

violate the stay imposed by the Bankruptcy

Court

/. C** Ab. f6 81124Z C

ltAiw&S77rgs &&&&/&</ c*u<rr Dor or €&&&

4) A judgement was entered on November 28, 1986, issued

from t

First District Court against the defendant Walker.

STATEMENT^OF^LAW
1)

A judgement is void and subject to a motion to vacate on t!

ground that the court entering the
over the

judgement lacked jurisdictic

defendant Ralph L. Walker,

Brimhall v. Mecham, 27 Ut<

2d 222, 494 P.2d 525 (1972)
2)

The federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over all matter

of the defendant from the time of filing. 28 U.S.C. 1334
3)

All actions

362 .

against the

defendant were stayed by 11 U.S.C

The continuation of the case

sanctions

under

the

code

for

was improper
all

who

and subject t

knowingly

continu

litigation after the filing.

ARGUMENT
1)

The court

filing of

lacked

jurisdiction

the bankruptcy

over

occurred on

the

defendant

as th

the 21st day of November

1986 and all proceedings against the defendant were automaticall
stayed.
should

The judgement was entered on November 28, 1986 and henc
be

defendant

vacated
has

been

as

the

court

harassed

by

occasions including a motion for
held in

February of

a

1987, months

relief under the bankruptcy code.
and his

counsel have

been In

lacked
the

jurisdiction.

plaintiff

supplemental

on

Th

numerou

hearing

to fa-

after the defendant filed fo:
All actions

of the plaintif

direct violation of the automata

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby

certify

that

a

OF

M A I L I N G

true

and

correct

copy

of the

foregoing
Memorandum of points and authorities

was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Robert H. Wilde, Attorney for Plaintiff
6925 Union Park Center, suite 490
Midvale, UT. 84047
Dated this

day of September 1987.

Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se

tAHIBII
3

ROBERT H. WILDE, USB # 34 66
COOK & WILDE, P . C .
Attorneys for Respondents
6925 Union Park C e n t e r , S u i t e 490
M i d v a l e , Utah 84047
T e l e p h o n e (801) 2 5 5 - 6 0 0 0
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

)
)
)

MONTY HIGLEY and JONNIE
HIGLEY,

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Plaintiffs/Respondents,
vs.

I
)
•;

RALPH L. WALKER,
Defendant, Appellant.

Supreme Court No. 87045

. )

Respondents reply to Appellant's Motion for Summary
Disposition by directing the Court's attention to the fact
that the record on Appeal is completely devoid of any
evidence which woul:3 support the arguments made in the
Appellant's Motion.

The record below contains nothing

more than bald argumentative assertions contained in
memoranda submitted on the Appellant's part.

There are no

affidavits, documents under seal or other evidence which
would support the Appellant's position.
DATED this J'"~

day of January, 1987.

ROBERT H. WliDE
Attornev for Plaintiffs/Resceneents

MAILED, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum in Response to Appellant?s Motion
for Summary Disposition to Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se, 8753
Wildrose Court, Highlands Ranch, Colorado 80126 this (j_. 7 vi
day of vJanuary, 1988.

r,

h hh•iS /

vJJl d<lJr

EXHIBIT
Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se
8753 Wildrose Court
HIGHLANDS RANCH, COLORADO 80126
<303) 791-8285
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MONTY
HIGLEY,
HIGLEY,
Plaintiffs,

AND

JONNIE
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM

vs .
RALPH L. WALKER,
MARSHA M. WALKER, and
DAVID WALKER
Defendants

Civil No. 24175

I
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IS TIMELY.
Defendant's motion to vacate the judgement

is brought under

Rule GO (a) and <b). The rule provides:
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on
the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the
court orders.
The court

may void

the judgement as the court did not have

jurisdiction over the defendant after November 21, 1986.
<b)

does

not

apply

to

the

instant

case

Rule 60

as the three month

deadline applies only to reasons <l), (2), (3), and (4).

Reason

(5) which

is that

limit on it.

the judgement

is void

does not

have a t

The Rule further states that:

This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain
independent action to relieve a party^Torj? a judgement, order
proceeding or to set aside a judgement Tor fraud upon the court
The•plaintiff has brought fraud upon the court by continul
the litigation

after the

prior notice and the subsequent fili

of the bankruptcy.

Counsel for the plaintiff

knew at

of the

continued to

automatic stay a

filing and

violate the

all tint

thereby committed fraud upon the court.
The proceedings
£roz£n_

in the

against

First

the

defendant

District Court,

were automatical.

any action by the cou

after November 21, 1987 was void and thereby should be vacated.

II.
THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT
The plaintiff's claim that
court Is

without merit.

an action
The

can be

continued in sta

law is very clear on this matte:

An action can be continued only with leave from the United Stati
Bankruptcy Court.

Relief

from the

stay was

not requested n<

granted.

III.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WERE NOT DISCHARGED.
The defendant
have

been

has not

discharged.

The

court and if the court were
plaintiff would

be a

alleged that

the plaintiff's clain

claims must be made in the props

to find

for the

secured creditor

plaintiff then tfc

of the debtor and in th

event that the

estate

could

not

pay

the

judgement

then the

plaintiff would be able to recover from the recovery fund,

IV.

PLAINTIFF RECEIVED PROPER NOTICE OF THE BANKRUPTCY
The plaintiff has perjured himself and his client by stating
that they weren't aware nor were they notified
the bankruptcy

petition-

but

that

because

listed

on

every

he was

sorry for the

of other matters the defendant

would file for a chapter 7 on November
was

21, 1987.

The plaintiff

creditor list submitted to the bankruptcy

court by the defendant, in care of the counsel for
at his

address.

filing of

The defendant called the plaintiff and

the court before the trial "and stated that
inconvenience

of the

He acknowledges

the plaintiff

the receipt of the discharge.

These notices to the creditors were mailed from the same
the

bankruptcy

court

and

were

plaintiff has no basis for his

list at

mailed to the plaintiff.

claim.

Regardless

of

The

when he

received the various notices, the automatic stay was in place and
precludes the court from continuing the litigation.

V.
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT SLEEP ON HIS RIGHTS
The jurisdiction of the
defendant
either had

sleeping

or

not

jurisdiction

defendant does

not effect

or

court

is

sleeping
it

did

not

dependant

on his rights.
not,

the jurisdiction

the

upon the
The court

actions

of the

of the

court.

The

defendant was
notices to

aware

that

the plaintiff

the

bankruptcy

of the

court

would provl

The plaintiff v

bankruptcy.

aware of the filing and instead continued to harass the defenda
in violation

of the

automatic stay.

The plaintiff ignored t

filing and didn't attempt to collect from the
slept

on

his

right

to

file

a claim because he knew that t

federal court would not recognize the
the filing of the defendants petitionthe plaintiff has attempted

estate, instead

judgement as

it was aft

Instead of filing a cla

to collect

money from

the recove

fund and continue to commit fraud upon the state courts.

VI.
THE PLAINTIFF'S

ARE NOT SEEKING AN ACTION AGAINST PROPERTY OF
THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE

The defendant agrees that no attempt has been made to
collect from

the bankruptcy

court.

The reason

is clear,

judgement would be ignored as it was obtained after the
in

place.

courts

and

The
the

violating the

fraudulent
recovery

attempt

fund

federal bankruptcy

with

stay w<

to collect from the stal
a

judgement

code should

judgement against the defendant must be vacated.
Dated this

t\

day of September, 1987.

obtained i

be barred and th

C E R T I F I C A T E

I

hereby

certify

that

OF

a

M A I L I N G

true

and

correct

copy of the

foregoing
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S

MEMORANDUM'

was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Robert H. Wilde, Attorney for Plaintiff
6925 Union Park Center, suite 490
Mldvale-, UT. 84047
Dated this

.

day of September 1987.

Ralph L. Walker, Pro Se

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
MONTY HIGLEY a n d JONNIE
HIGLEY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff
v.

Civil No.

2 4175

RALPH L. WALKER; MARSHA WALKER;
DAVID WALKER, STEVE BROWN,
and LOLA JENSEN dba HEARTLAND
HOMES and RLW DEVELOPMENT,
Defendant

Defendant Ralph Walker has filed a Motion to Vacate the
Judgement entered on November 28, 19 86.
until September 23, 1987.

The Motion was not filed

Defendant does not state the grounds

under which he requests a vacation of the judgment. However, it
appears that it be under Rule 60(b) which must be made three months
after the entry of judgment.
Therefore, the defendant's motion is not timely made and is
denied.

Counsel for plaintiff to prepare the appropriate order.

Dated this ^'?,A~

day of October, 19 87.
BY

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

tAMlD!I

March 3, 1988

(1

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Robert H. Wilde
Attorney at Law
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490
Midvale, UT 84047

Monty Higley and Jonnie
Higley,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.

No. 870456

Ralph L. Walker, Marsha M. Walker,
and David Walker,
Defendants and Appellant.

Appellant's motion for summary reversal of the order
appealed is hereby granted. Under Section 362 of the federal
Bankruptcy Code, the action against appellant was automatically
stayed when he filed a petition in bankruptcy. The judgment against
him is therefore void. The district court order denying vacation of
the void judgment on the ground that the motion to vacate was not
filed within three months of the entry of the judgment is manifestly
in error, since a motion under Rule 60(b)(5) Utah R. Civ. P. is not
required to be brought within three months. This matter is remanded
for the purpose of vacating the void judgment.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

IN THE UNITED
FOR

STATES BANKRUPTCY

THE DISTRICT OF

COURT

COLORADO

Case No. 8 7 J 0 93 8

in the matter
RALPH

L.

EXHIBIT

of

WALKER,

Deb t o r
Courtroom C
400 Columbine Building
1845 Sherman
Denver, Colorado
February

Proceedings

had before

19, 198 8

the HONORABLE

J, BRUMBAUGH, Judge of the United
C o u r t , commencing

at the hour

States

of 1:15

ROLAND

Bankruptcy

p.m.,

this

date

Higley

and

APPEARANCES :
RALPH

L. WALKER,
Pro Se .

ROBERT H. WILDE,
BRUCE ANDERSON,
Attorneys at Law,
For Robert W i l d e , Monty
jonnie Higley.

CAT by TRISA

COOPER

(303)

844-4662

(Whereupon, the following
had

in open

court

transcribed

following

pursuant

THE C O U R T :
was commenced

to ordering

by the filing
was treated

such

in order

is needed

part

of

with

supplemental

hearing

1 9 8 7 , and have held
estate
from

broker1s

the Utah

Real

I take
indeed, payment
Walker1s

Recovery

license has been

party.

require
Fund

underlying
February

and

Recovery

from

revoked;

That's

complaint,

in

c a s e , 86

receive

payment

Fund.

that

that,

fund and

is that

They are an
in the

11242 C, he did

COOPER

Mr.

correct?

(303)

Estate

indispensable
debtor's

indicate

a Chapter

that

Real

that

11 case and

it wa s dismissed.

CAT by TRISA

real

true.

note that

of 1 9 8 6 , he filed

for a

February,

the Utah

the presence of the Utah

also

have

an order

In that case the damages

as a party.

I would

for

the defendants

to have

has been made

THE COURT:
seek

In the

efforts with

revoked

because

it the parties have admitted

MR. WALKER:

you

stay.

hearings

Estate

adversary

an action

in Salt Lake City

license

not

counsel.)

as a complaint

are that

collection

were

of a, q u o t e , "motion,"

to bring

the automatic

of the allegations

continued

proceedings

W e l l , this particular

u n q u o t e , which

violation

other

proceedings

844-4662

in
that

So

1

it's the order

2

motion

for change of venue

3

adversary, and

4

entire

5

of Utah .

7

matrix

underlying

3

other

that

is granted

case

going

to the

to tender

You may

Thank

10

THE COURT:

Mr. W i l d e , I will

Thank

prepare

you, Your

District

that in

the
some

a form of order

Honor.:
appreciate

for my

you.

13

THE COURT:

14

(Whereupon, these proceedings

15

the

matter.

MR. W I L D E :

12

that

you back

need

9

if you"would

the

in this

is transferred

you submitted.

evidentiary

11

that

likewise, sua sponte, ordered

Mr. W i l d e , I'm

6

of the Court

Court

will be a recess.
were

conclud ed . )

15
17
18
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24
25
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it

signature

It
dismissed

is my understanding

for several

f e e s , failure
file proper

reasons:

to attend

was

to pay

341 m e e t i n g s , and

That w a s n f t

It was settled

determined

failure

case

filin

failure

to

schedules.

MR. WALKER:
Honor.

that that

that

with

that was

the c a s e , Your

the creditors

the easiest

way

and
to

settle

the ca se .
THE COURT:

W e l l , I talked

to the clerk

in

the Utah bankruptcy

case before lunch, Mr. Walker,

and

file shows, and

that's what

all but

the

one de minimus

Utah, and

if I apply

creditor

I would

in this

c a s e , which

at 24 BR 444 --

it is my opinion, and

that not only
the District
is.

That's

where

they

is this

should

all

I intend

adversary

of U t a h , but
where

case

have had

I!m

this one creditor

least

what's

the

locals

notice

and

everybody

in Utah

alleged, and

are.

over

so I'm

there rather

to

COCPER

(303)

to
case

That's
to be hear

entered

going

here
At

to let

receive

than

here.
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ruling,

no n o t i c e .

have their chance

be heard
over

had

so

found

underlying

an opportunity

but at least

is in

transferred

the entire

the creditors

tha

Macon

to do --

Sure, there's been a discharge

that's

estate

the standards of the

Uplands Venture

note

344-4662

dragging
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I, TRISA
certify

that

the

COOPER, a Court
foregoing

Reporter, do

proceedings

were

stenographical1y

reported

by me at the time and

herein

and

said

set

forth

thereafter

reduced

the foregoing
and correct
a nd there

that

proceedings

to typewritten

place

were

form by m e , as per

t r a n s c r i p t , the same being

transcription

hereby

a full,

of my stenograph

notes

ta ken .
DATED

this

23rd day of February, 1983.
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